Do quality improvements in assisted reproduction technology increase patient numbers in a managed competition setting?
In a system of managed competition, selective contracting and patient choice reward providers for quality improvements through increases in patient numbers and revenue. We research whether these mechanisms function as envisioned by investigating the relationship between quality improvements and patient numbers in assisted reproduction technology in the Netherlands. Success rate improvements primarily reduce volume as fewer secondary treatments are necessary, but this can be compensated by attracting new patients. Using nationwide registry data from 1996 to 2016, we find limited evidence that high-quality clinics attract new patients, and insufficiently as to compensate for the reduction in secondary treatments. The net effect of quality increases appears to be a small decline in revenue. Therefore, we conclude that patient choice and active purchasing reward quality improvements insufficiently. Nevertheless, clinics have improved quality drastically over the last years, showing that financial incentives are perhaps less important factors for quality improvements than factors such as intrinsic motivation and professional autonomy.